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ABSTRACT 
Objective of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to study acquirers performance persistence issue in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) market based on empirical evidence from EU 15 countries. This study provides 
an overview of different factors affecting serial acquirers’ performance in M&A market as 
measured by excess stock returns. Focus of this thesis is to test the existence of acquirers 
performance persistence and factors contributing to this possible persistence effect. 
Academic background and methodology 
An overview of existing theories and analysis framework regarding M&A market and acquirers’ 
performance behaviors is obtained through literature research. Empirical data regarding M&A 
market in EU 15 countries are obtained from various data sources available from Aalto University 
School of Business. Data are processed by using statistical package EViews. The purpose of the 
statistical analysis is to discover relations between various variables and acquirers’ performance 
persistence in M&A deals. The regression results are analyzed using established theories on M&A 
performance, as well as by comparing with relevant study from other scholars. 
Findings and conclusions 
This thesis uses a statistical analysis model in which different variables pertinent to M&A deals, 
together with acquirers’ prior performance, are analyzed for detecting their impacts on acquirers’ 
performance. This study reveals that depending on different model specifications, acquirers’ 
performance persistence can be identified in terms of value creation for own companies, value 
creation for both acquirers and targets, and acquirers’ bargaining power in acquisition deals. 
Key words 
M&A, Performance persistence, Cumulative abnormal return  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
As one of the most popular forms of corporate growth, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have 
attracted academic research interest from a broad range of angles (Cartwright et al, 2006). M&A are 
usually regarded as very critical decisions made by a company, and successful M&A deals in theory 
create value for both the acquirers and the target companies by combining complementary assets, as 
well as through economies of scale and scope, while unsuccessful M&A deals are expected to have 
reverse effects (Bao et al, 2009). 
In recognition of this potentially significant value-creation power that M&A have, a large 
amount of research effort is dedicated to studying the impact of M&A on company’s performance, 
from both acquirers and target companies perspectives.  Existing literatures reveal that target 
companies usually gain from acquisitions (Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann (JPV), 2008), while the 
conclusion for acquirers is less clear (Cartwright et al, 2006). Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) point out 
that in the months following the acquisition investors of acquiring companies usually see share 
price underperformance, and in an earlier study, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) find that 
shareholders of acquiring companies experience about 10% loss over the five-year period after the 
acquisition. From shorter term perspective, the most popular measurement for acquirers’ acquisition 
performance has been the excess stock returns to acquirers around the deal announcement date. 
Excess stock returns can be calculated using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method. Using 
CAR as a measurement, academics have found evidence for both value-creating and value-
destroying in short term from acquirers’ perspective. Also in an attempt to better understand the 
performance dynamics in short term, scholars have related an acquirer’s CARs with various 
characteristics that are pertinent to the deal. Most widely used explanatory factors in this regard 
include methods of payment by the acquirers, private or public status of the target companies, size 
of the target companies, etc. (Chang (2000), Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Hansen and 
Robert G (1987), Servaes (1991), Travlos (1987), Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987)).  
If acquirers’ short term performance is indeed influenced by characteristics pertinent to 
acquisition deals, one immediate question that can be asked from acquirers’ perspective is: For 
serial acquirers whose deal characteristics can be tracked back over a long period of time, do they 
exhibit performance persistence measured by excess stock returns in each acquisition deal? 
Although some scholars have attempted to address this question from managers’ acquisition skills 
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perspective (Croci and Petmezas, 2009, Aktas, Bodt and Roll, 2009), relatively little research has 
been done to directly analyze acquirers’ performance persistence measured by excess stock returns 
on company level. Using CARs as a measurement for acquisition performance, JPV (2008) made 
one of the first studies to systematically analyze whether acquirers in M&A exhibit persistence in 
performance, based on the analysis of potential relations between acquirers’ performance in 
previous acquisition deals and the same acquirers’ performance in following deals. Their study 
provides good methodology framework for tackling acquirers’ performance persistence.  
As this study is based on empirical data from the U.S. market, one natural extension from 
empirical research perspective is to test whether acquirers exhibit similar performance patterns in 
the European market. Also one potential limitation of this study, as is the case with a few other 
studies that follows, is that M&A advisors’ role in acquirers’ performance is not studied.  In reality 
M&A advisors (usually investment banks) do exert significant influence on acquirers’ performance, 
and this is also supported by the empirical study by Bao and Edmans (2011), in which they have 
systematically analyzed M&A advisors’ performance persistence in acquisition deals. 
Motivated by existing research in both acquirers’ performance persistence and M&A advisors’ 
performance persistence, I want to conduct a comprehensive study to see whether acquirers exhibit 
performance persistence in European market, and if such persistence exists, is it robust after 
factoring the potential influence from M&A advisors.  
1.2 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
As stated in the motivation part, I will try to provide the missing link between M&A advisors’ 
skills and acquirers’ performance. Also tests carried out in the U.S. market on acquirers’ M&A 
performance are applied to the European market, which could give insights into how the two 
markets differ in terms of acquirers’ performance persistence. Besides, I use a new measurement for 
acquirers’ performance persistence in term of bargaining power. I measure this potential effect by 
analyzing the relation between acquisition premiums same acquirers pay to different target 
companies in a serial of deals. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I first give a review of existing research literature 
on acquirers’ performance and performance persistence. Then I introduce main hypotheses for my 
thesis. After that I describe the methodology and data used in this study. Then I present the main 
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regression results, followed by analysis of the results, robustness test and conclusion. At the end, 
some suggestion for further research on this topic is given. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 ACQUIRERS’ ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
2.1.1 Acquirers’ acquisition performance from long-term perspective  
Evaluation of acquirers’ acquisition performance includes both long-term and short-term 
perspective. Long-term perspective essentially focuses on acquirers’ post-acquisition operating 
performance, and acquirers’ profitability metrics, most notably pre-tax operating cash flow adjusted 
by acquirers’ size and industry, are often used to measure post-acquisition performance (Martynova, 
Oosting and Renneboog, 2006). Research on this topic has been predominantly based on US market 
data, together with a few studies focusing on UK market and continental Europe. Such work tries to 
relate corporate operating performance after the acquisition with various characteristics pertinent to 
acquisition deals and have reached inconsistent conclusions. Regarding the method of payment used 
in acquisitions, Linn and Switzer (2001) report that the impact on post-acquisition operating 
performance is significantly larger if the acquirer offers cash payment. Also they find that such 
impact does not depend on deal size, level of similarity between the acquirer’s and the target 
company’s industry, or the acquirer’s leverage. Heron and Lie (2002) also find acquirers tend to 
outperform peer companies both prior to and after the acquisition, however their study shows no 
evidence that the method of payment in acquisition affects the acquirer’s future operating 
performance. On the other hand, Ghosh (2001) uses firm-specific data matched by pre-acquisition 
performance and size as a benchmark to analyze how operating performance might have been 
improved following a corporate acquisition, and he finds such improvement effect does not exist for 
acquirers. Using evidence from Australia, Sharma and Ho reach (2002) similar conclusion that 
corporate acquisition does not lead to significant operating performance improvement for acquirers. 
Furthermore, some other studies, some of which use empirical evidence from other part of the 
world than the US market, have found negative impact of acquisition on acquirers’ ex post 
operating performance. Based on Japanese corporate M&A deals from 1970 to 1994, Yeh and 
Hoshino (2002) find that companies actually register performance deterioration following the deal, 
although their study focuses specifically on merger rather than acqusition cases, and the metrics 
they use to measure companies’ operating performance are net income and operating income, 
instead of operating cash flow. In a slightly earlier study, Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1997) 
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discover that for large UK-based public companies, acquisitions have significant negative impact on 
acquirers in terms of return on assets (ROA). 
2.1.2 Acquirers’ acquisition performance from short-term perspective 
The basic and most used approach to gauge acquirers’ acquisition performance in short-term has 
been measuring the abnormal return to acquirers’ stock around the date of acquisition deal 
announcement (JPV, 2008). Similar to the case in evaluation of acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance from long-term perspective, academics are divided regarding whether acquisitions 
create value for acquirers over short term. Some early empirical evidence shows that acquirers’ 
CARs around the deal announcement date are essentially zero, or even negative (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). Based on acquisition and divestiture deals from 1990 to 1999, Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
find slightly negative stock price return for acquirers in the three-day window around the 
acquisition. Controlling for deal size, payment method and other relevant variables, studies using 
data from earlier time also report similar results supporting negative share price returns assumption 
for acquirers (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, 
and Stafford, 2001). Agrawal et al. (1992) include a comprehensive sample of mergers between 
NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX target companies in their analysis and find a statistically 
significant 10% loss in share price return to acquirers. This study, however, uses a different model 
specification as it focuses on stock returns to acquirers over five years after the acquisition. 
On the contrary side, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins find statistically significant positive abnormal 
return to acquirers by using acquisition information in the US from 1955-1979. An interesting point 
raised up in their study is that many acquirers tend to have a M&A programme, meaning that the 
same acquirer makes more than one acquisitions during a certain period of time as part of its M&A 
plan. By arguing this they suggest that it’s necessary to consider an acquirer’s acquisitions together, 
instead of separately. 
Some others scholars argue because in M&A many target companies are small compared to the 
acquirers, the impact of the acquisition is too small to be meaningfully reflected in acquirers’ share 
price movement (Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams, 1990).  This argument is supported by Bruner 
(2002), who points out in his work that acquisitions do create value for acquirers and target 
companies together, however the returns to acquirers are essentially evenly scattered around zero. 
2.2 ACQUIRERS’ PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
Although academics haven’t reached a universal agreement regarding the impact of acquisitions 
on acquirers’ stock return around deal announcement date, this is clear that on individual company 
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level, acquirers show significantly different level of performance (JPV, 2008). As a result it will be 
very interesting to see whether acquirers exhibit performance persistence in a series of deals, and 
how an acquirer’s performance in previous acquisitions might influence the same acquirer’s 
performance in following deals. 
2.2.1 Management motivations, skills and hubris 
Within the limited amount of study that is devoted to directly address the issue on acquirers’ 
performance persistence, some scholars have focused on management motivations and skills to 
explain acquirers’ performance persistence. Croci and Petmezas (2009) have studied the rationales 
for acquirers to make serial acquisitions. They find that overall for serial acquirers as a group it does 
not show any performance persistence or reversal, while acquirers who achieve positive return in a 
deal do continue to generate positive returns in following deals. 
Management hubris is the overconfidence of acquirers’ management that they are able to better 
manage assets in the target company, and it usually leads to overvaluing the target company in the 
bidding process (Roll (1986), Hayward and Hambrick, (1997)). Management hubris has often been 
considered as one of the main reasons why serial acquirers realize declining CARs in their deals. 
Ismail (2008) finds in his study that single acquirers outperform multiple acquirers by 1.66% in 
terms of stock price returns, and he explains this result by arguing that successful first-deal 
acquirers usually suffer from hubris behavior in following acquisition attempts. 
Aktas, Bodt and Roll (2009) study how CEOs hubris and learning process may have contributed 
to serial acquirers’ acquisition performance. They argue that contrary to common belief, declining 
CAR for serial acquirers cannot be reliably attributed to acquirers’ CEOs hubris. Instead, they find 
that management learning process leads risk adverse rational CEOs to adapt their acquisition 
behaviors, which will result in lowered CAR in following deals. Also, they predict that for rational 
CEOs in the acquiring company, learning process should shorten the time between consecutive 
deals, while for CEOs with hubris, the time between two consecutive deals tend to get longer. 
2.2.2 Performance persistence and deal characteristics 
From a wider perspective, some other scholars try to explain serial acquirers’ performance 
persistence using a range of deal characteristics pertinent to each acquisition. Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) study the stock returns to companies that make five or more acquisitions within 
a short period of time. From their research they recognize the public status of the target company, 
and the method of payment used in the deal as factors that affect the most returns to acquirers. 
Although their study is based on performance of serial acquirers, how an acquirer’s prior deal 
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performance might affect the same acquirer’s following deal performance is not included in their 
study. Also, their study suffers from a potential selection bias, as only acquirers that have made at 
least five deals would enter into the sample. 
By controlling for a comprehensive set of acquisition deals characteristics variables that are 
known to impact acquisition performance, Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann (2008) have studied 
whether acquirers demonstrate performance persistence. Their basic approach is analyzing the 
relation between successive deals CAR to the same acquirer, and based on U.S. data, they find that 
a successful acquirer in last deal on average earns 0.44% more on next deal than a previously-
unsuccessful acquirer. 
The work by JPV (2008) represents one of the first comprehensive studies devoted to serial 
acquirers’ performance persistence. In addition to their work, some other scholars have also 
analyzed this topic by using specific deal characteristics as explanation factors for acquirers’ 
performance persistence. Ahern (2008) studies the abnormal returns to repeat acquirers’ and finds 
that as repeat acquirers get larger, they tend to choose target companies of smaller relative size in an 
attempt to optimize integration and transaction costs. As a result, the decrease in relative deal size 
leads to declining returns to acquirers. Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2004) in their study have 
briefly discussed the impact of acquirers’ first deal success on its subsequent deals and they find 
declining acquirers’ performance in subsequent deals following successful first deal. However, no 
detailed analysis on this finding is provided in their study. I list below factors commonly recognized 
by academics as alternative explanations for acquirers’ performance persistence. Also I provide 
prevailing academic arguments for them regarding their impacts on acquirers’ performance. Many 
of these factors are first used by scholar in the study of acquirers’ performance in stand-alone deals, 
and afterwards they are also applied to the analysis of serial acquirers’ performance persistence. 
Managerial skills 
In their analysis of the impact of managerial performance on tender offer results, Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling (1989) find a low Tobin’s q reduces acquirers’ returns. They further argue that as Tobin’s 
q measures managerial performance, this finding shows that acquirers under good management can 
benefit more from tender offers, and this benefit is enhanced if the target company has a low 
Tobin’s q, indicating poor management in the target company. In another paper published two years 
later, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) use Tobin’s q to indentify agency problems faced by 
different acquirers and they show that as the cash flow of acquirers with low Tobin’s q increase, the 
abnormal returns for acquirers with low Tobin’s q actually decrease compared to the abnormal 
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returns for acquirers with high Tobin’s q. This result holds true after controlling for other 
characteristics pertinent to acquisition deals. The authors explain this phenomenon by arguing that 
underperforming management of acquirers, as indicated by the low Tobin’s q, lacks the capability 
to capitalize on the synergy from the acquisition deals. Based on a sample of over 700 mergers and 
tender offers between 1972 and 1987, Servaes (1991) confirms the findings from Lang et al. by 
arguing that the announcement abnormal returns are larger for both acquirers and target companies 
when acquirers have high Tobin’s q and target companies have low Tobin’s q. 
Public status of the target company 
By examining more than 12000 completed acquisitions from US market, Bradley and Sundaram 
(2006) find that the organizational form of the target, namely whether the target is public or not, 
exert the most significant influence on excess stock returns to acquirers around the deal 
announcement date. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find that after controlling for method of 
payment, the stock return measured by CAR for frequent acquirers is significantly negative if the 
target company is public, while the return is significantly positive when they buy a private firm or a 
subsidiary. They conclude this is because the characteristics of a public target and its relation with 
the acquirer are different than if the target is a private or subsidiary company. They further argue 
that the lack of liquidity makes private or subsidiary companies less attractive, which drives down 
their value and leads to higher CAR for acquirers. 
This result is consistent with the study by Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006). Based on the 
abnormal returns to acquirers around announcement period in 17 Western European countries 
between 1996 and 2001, they find persistent difference between average abnormal return to 
acquirers of unlisted targets and acquirers of listed targets, with the former one being significantly 
higher than the latter one. 
Size effect 
Size effect on acquirers’ CAR is two-folded. First of all, if the size of an acquirer and the size of 
the deal are disparate, then the excess stock returns to the acquirer measured by CAR will be 
dwindled to minimal even if the dollar value of the abnormal return is significant (Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins, 1983). Secondly, some scholars also argue that as deals get bigger in size relative to 
acquirers, the relation between acquirers and target comapnies, most notably the bargaining power 
between acquirers and target companies, may also change, which affect the value creation and 
distribution dynamics of the acquisition process. 
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Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find in their study that acquirers’ abnormal returns are 
positively related to the relative size of target companies. They report that on average an acquirer’s 
CAR from an acquisition of a target half the size of the acquirer is 1.8% higher than the CAR from 
an acquisition of a target one-tenth the size of the acquirer. This can potentially be explained both 
by the higher expectation the market has towards a large acquisition deal, as well as by the fact that 
a larger deal usually is related with more prudent target screening and decision-making process 
from the acquirers’ management side, which helps to identify better targets and produce higher 
acquisition performance. 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) explain that the larger the target is, the stronger 
negotiation position the target has in the acquisition process, which hinders acquirers from 
extracting more value from the deal. Correspondingly they find a negative relation between the size 
of public targets and acquirers’ CAR, although the effect regarding the size of private or subsidiary 
companies is less clear. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) offer analysis on the effect of acquirers’ size on 
acquirers’ CAR. Based on 12000 deals by public companies from 1980 to 2001, they document that 
the abnormal return to acquirers is about 2% higher for small acquirers, and the result is robust 
when controlling for other deal characteristics. They attribute this result to the fact that large 
acquirers tend to pay higher premiums in the acquisition, and they usually realize negative dollar 
synergy gains. Deeper-level explanation for such phenomena traces back managerial hubris issues 
which are supposed to be more prominent in large companies. 
Domestic/international target 
Some scholars have looked at the impact of different national cultures on acquirers’ performance. 
We can expect the issue related with national culture difference to be most prominent if the acquirer 
and the target company are from two different countries. Most existing studies analyze this topic 
from a long-term performance perspective and use operational metrics to measure acquirers’ post-
acquisition performance. According to most previous theoretical research, different national 
cultures incur higher post-acquisition integration cost which hinders acquirers’ performance. 
Contrarily, Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) use statistical regression to analyze the impact of 
cross-border acquisition and find acquirers actually improve their performance by benefiting from 
diverse set of skills and routines embedded in the target company. Their study however, is also 
based on long-term perspective and uses acquirers’ sales growth for the two years following the 
acquisition to measure acquirers’ performance. 
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Short-term evidence on this issue is found in Moeller and Schlingemann’s work (2005), where 
they report significantly lower announcement returns for U.S. acquirers buying oversea targets than 
acquirers making domestic acquisitions. 
On the other hand, Dewenter (1995) find no significant difference in returns to acquirers between 
domestic and international deals, although his findings are based on two specific industry sectors 
(chemical and retail) in US market. 
One related study that focuses on European market is done by Conn et al. (2006). Based on UK 
market they find that if the target company is public and located abroad, the acquirer realizes zero 
announcement return while if the target company is either private or a subsidiary, cross-border 
acquisition generates positive announcement return for the acquirers. 
Method of payment 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990) show that acquirers’ CAR is positive with cash payment and 
it is negative when the deal is financed by equity. This result is supported by the general findings 
regarding the negative announcement effect of equity financing on stock price. This result is also 
consistent with an earlier study by Travlos (1987), in which he finds acquirers’ stocks experience 
significant loss at the deal announcement date if the deal is purely equity financed, while acquirers’ 
stocks realize “normal” rate of return if the deal is financed by cash. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
back this assumption by arguing that if acquirers’ management have better information about the 
acquirers’ prospect than the market, they will finance acquisitions with stock when stock is 
overpriced and with cash otherwise. 
Some scholars have analyzed the impact on acquirers’ CAR by relating method of payment to 
the public status of the target company. Chang (1998) has specifically studied the effect of payment 
method when the target is a privately held company. Findings from the study show that comapred 
with the negative CAR for acquirers when the target company is public, acquirers gain positive 
CAR in stock offers, while offers financed by cash do not generate any abnormal returns for 
acquirers. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find that when the target is a public company, 
paying with stock will generate significantly negative returns for the acquirer. When it comes to 
acquisition of a private company or a subsidiary, however, stock payment is associated with higher 
acquirers’ CAR when compared with cash or other forms of payment. In addition, Franks, Harris 
and Mayer (1988) report that acquisitions which are all equity financed exhibit significantly 
10 
 
negative return for the acquirers, which they explain as the possible result of the signaling effect to 
the market and consequently the triggering of downward revaluation of the acquirers’ equity. 
Industrial diversification 
It is commonly accepted that companies can benefit from focusing on operating in one specific 
industry or a few selected business sectors, instead of spreading out into too many different 
battlefields. From company management perspective, this can be explained by more focused 
industry-specific expertise, more coherent strategy making and implementation process, as well as 
potentially less conflicts of interest arising from different internal business lines inside the company. 
From external investors and market point of view, it is also easier to give fair valuation to such 
companies because of more transparent company structure. 
From a sample of 326 acquisitions in US market between 1975 and 1987, Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) find in 1980s when acquirers make unrelated acquisitions they typically experience 
negative announcement period returns, although no such empirical evidence is found for deals 
occurred in 1970s. 
In the same study where they analyze the cross-border effect on acquirers’ performance, Moeller 
and Schlingemann (2005) also find that acquirers’ announcement stock returns are negatively 
related with an increase in industrial diversification. 
Despite such empirical evidence showing penalty for acquirers who diversify, Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) find no statistically significant difference in return to acquirers between same-
industry and cross-industry mergers. 
Time lag between two consecutive deals 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) document that if an acquirer makes multiple targets within 
a short period of time, the acquirer’s CAR shows deterioration in later deals. They attribute this 
phenomenon partly to the possibility that acquirers tend to negotiate less efficient and creates less 
synergy out of the acquisition if its deals are concentrated in a short period of time. As a result, 
stock market reaction to its deals becomes less favorable. 
This finding resonates with the study by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2008). Their work shows that 
companies who report longer time lag between two consecutive acquisition deals appear to generate 
higher CARs. This finding is further supported by the theory that it takes time to identify a good 
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deal which can generate significantly positive return, and thus hasty acquisition decisions on 
average lead to poor market reaction. 
Competing bidders 
In the existence of competing bidders, meaning that more than one potential acquirer are 
pursuing a target company, we can expect target’s bargaining position to be significantly enhanced, 
which in return can damage the value created for acquirers. 
Chang (1990) has shown that the entry of additional potential acquirers reduces the winning 
acquirer’s market value by 10% measured by the dollar value paid for the target company. Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) also find empirical evidence showing if there is competition among potential 
acquirers of a same target company, the acquirer’s return is decreased while the return to the target 
company is increased. 
Under competition pressure acquirers may take hasty decisions regarding the acquisition deal, 
which also could on the acquirer’s acquisition performance. 
2.3 M&A ADVISOR’ PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
The skilled advice hypothesis argues that as M&A is not a very frequent activity for most 
companies, managers typically lack experience to conduct M&A deals alone. M&A advisors 
provide advice to parties involved in M&A and such advice is generally considered to be value-
adding. As a result, the skills level and historical performance of M&A advisors could affect 
acquirers’ performance level. By measuring acquirers’ CAR around deals announcement, Bao and 
Edmans (2009) document significant persistence in the average announcement returns to 
acquisitions advised by investment banks. They find that M&A advisors in the top quintile based on 
acquirers’ acquisition announcement returns over the past two years generate on average 1.04% 
more returns than advisors in the bottom quintile do over the next two years. Although this study 
analyzes acquirers’ returns related with a particular investment bank rather than with a particular 
acquirer, it provides valuable insights to an often-overlooked factor that could exert influence on 
acquirers’ performance, namely the skills of M&A advisors. 
On a more general level, Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) find statistically and economically 
significant relation between investment bankers’ performance and total announcement period 
returns, acquirers’ operating performance as well as long-term stock returns. These findings set a 
good theoretical foundation for studying the impact of M&A advisors’ historical performance on 
acquirers’ performance persistence. 
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3. HYPOTHESES 
In this part I will introduce and elaborate on my hypotheses. Although on average acquirers 
abnormal returns around the deal announcement measured by CAR are usually small or even 
negative, historically the return variations among individual acquirers are very big (Fuller, Netter 
and Stegemoller, 2002). This phenomenon makes it both academically interesting and economically 
meaningful to analyze the following question: Do some acquirers continue outperforming other 
acquirers in terms of stock price returns surrounding deal announcement? In other words, do 
acquirers exhibit performance persistence in M&A? 
The main purpose of my thesis is to study serial acquirers’ performance persistence. Also, my 
thesis tries to analyze the potential impacts of M&A advisors on acquirers’ performance. In addition, 
I will also analyze whether the impact of previous unsuccessful deals on following deals is 
materially different from that of previous successful deals. 
According to Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann (2008), acquirers’ performance in acquisition deals 
can be best measured from three perspectives, namely the ability to create value for their own 
company, the ability to create combined value for their own company and the target company as a 
whole, and the ability to extract value from the combined value created. All these three perspectives 
have their theoretical foundation in management expertise and learning process hypothesis, 
although the first two perspectives appear to be more related with management’s skills in target 
selection and analyzing, while the last perspective can be better explained by management’s 
bargaining power in acquisitions. Based on this I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Acquirers exhibit performance persistence in creating value for their 
own company 
Hypothesis 2: Acquirers exhibit performance persistence in creating combined value 
for both the acquirer and the target company 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirers exhibit performance persistence in extracting value from the 
total value created 
In addition to these three approaches for measuring acquirers’ performance, some scholars also 
measure acquirers’ performance in terms of the premiums they pay to target companies. These 
scholars argue that successful serial acquirers tend to pay lower premium to target companies 
(Huang and Walkling, 1987, Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983). To test whether acquirers’ 
performance persistence also exists in this form, I have hypothesis 4: 
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Hypothesis 4: Acquirers exhibit performance persistence in terms of premiums paid to 
target companies 
A few scholars have studied the performance persistence of M&A advisors in a stand-alone 
fashion (Bao and Edmans, 2009) and results are found suggesting M&A advisors performance 
persistence in terms of generating extra value for the deal. As M&A advisors are working closely 
with both acquirers and targets companies in many areas covering not only the financing function 
but also legal and wider strategy aspects, I hypothesize that the skills of M&A advisors is partly 
transferrable to acquirers and thus helps enhance acquirers’ performance persistence 
Hypothesis 5: M&A advisors’ performance improves acquirers’ performance 
4. DATA 
4.1 DATA SOURCE AND SELECTION CRITERIA 
Following the work by JPV (2008), the sample for this study includes all mergers and 
acquisitions from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database based 
on following criteria: 
 The announcement data occurred between 1 January, 1991 and 31 December, 2010; 
 The deal went through successfully and the deal value was disclosed; 
 The value of the deal was at least 10 million EUR. Initially in the study by JPV (2008), the 
deal value threshold is set at 1 million USD. As the acquirers included in the sample are all 
publicly-listed companies whose size are significantly larger than 1 million USD, I raise the 
selection threshold to 10 million EUR  in order to include only acquisition deals that have a 
meaningful impact on acquirers’ stock return rather than market noise;  
 The acquirer acquired more than 50% of the target company in the deal; 
 The acquirer was a public company listed in EU 15 countries; 
 The target can be a private company, public company or subsidiary of a public company. 
Geographical location of the target is not restricted in the selection process; 
 The acquisition did not occur within two trading days of another takeover by the same 
bidder. This requirement is set with the main purpose to limiting overlapping announcement 
effects from the same acquirer’s two acquisitions deals that occur very close with each other 
in time. 
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Using this set of criteria I include 9251 deals in the initial sample. Matching the observations 
with both announcement dates and Datastream identifiers, 131 duplicated deals reported by 
Datastream are excluded from the sample. Also there are 378 deals in which the acquirer are 
Datastream as public company but no historical share price information is provided. By subtracting 
these observations, 8742 observations are included in the final sample set for analysis. 
All stock price data are from Datastream. Individual companies’ stock price is matched with 
acquisition deal-specific information using Datastream codes provided by SDC. For target 
companies whose Datastream codes are not available from SDC, Sedol codes from SDC are used as 
identifiers to extract companies’ stock price information from Datastream. 
4.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY 
Table 1 provides information on the number of deals in each calendar year in the sample. There 
are two peak periods with high acquisition frequency: Around Year 1999 and Year 2007. This result 
is hardly surprising as 1999 saw the dot-com bubble and the years around 2007 were accompanied 
by the upsurge of leveraged buyout (LBOs) activities. Table 2 presents breakdown of all deals 
included in the sample by acquirers’ nation. As we can see acquisitions are dominated by acquirers 
based in the UK, comprising about half of the total deals. Acquirers from France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherland, Spain and Sweden also contribute to a significant portion of total deals. When it comes 
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to the public status of target companies, Table 3 shows that about 36% of the deals are acquisition 
of private companies. This figure represents lower portion of private target companies compared 
with the one reported by JPV (2008), in which they document about 60% of the targets in their 
sample as private companies. This can be attributed to the fundamental difference between US and 
European M&A market, while a more direct reason might be that in my thesis a higher deal value 
threshold is used when selecting the sample. When targets are private companies the deal value on 
average tends to be lower. As a result the portion of private company acquisitions are lower in the 
sample. 
Table 4 provides a detailed view on the number of acquirers, number of deals and value of deals 
in each calendar year. The second column shows the number of acquirers in each year, and the third 
column shows the number of deals in each year. As indicated in table 1, both the number of 
acquirers and the number of deals peaked around Year 1999 as well as Year 2007. Also it is 
noticeable that on average both the number of acquirers and the number of deals are higher after 
Year 2000 than before Year 1996. The fourth column reports the total deal value in each year, and it 
follows a similar pattern across years compared with the number of acquirers and the number of 
deals. 
From the fifth column through the twelfth column categorization of deals in each year by method 
of payment is reported. Following Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann (2008), I define deals where the 
consideration is all cash or equity as “Cash” and “Stock”, respectively. For acquisitions that are 
financed partly by cash and partly by equity or other types of consideration, I define them as 
“Combined”. Deals for which no information is available regarding the type of payment are 
categorized as “Unknown”. All method of payment information comes from SDC. 
The last row in the fifth column shows that in total 2818 deals, or about one third of the total 
deals are fully financed by cash. The last row in the seventh column shows that only 651 deals, or 
less than 8% of the total deals are fully paid using equity. This result is significantly different from 
Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann’s work (2008), in which they report similar numbers of deals fully 
funded by cash and deals fully funded by equity over 1981-2007. This difference can be an 
indication that the value size of a large number of deals in EU 15 countries during 1991-2010 is 
small, as acquirers tend to use more cash financing in small-sized deals. Other explanations for this 
difference can be derived from possible difference in market fundamentals between the U.S. and 
EU 15 countries, because empirical evidence shows that acquirers with higher growth opportunities 
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      Table 4  This table reports all sample deals categorized by calendar years and method of payment. Deal value is reported in billion Euros 
    
Method of payment used in acquisition 
 
Years 
Number of 
Acquirers 
Deals 
Total deal 
value 
Cash Stock Combined Unknown 
    
Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
Number 
of deals 
Deal 
value 
1991 157 189 53.4 38 8.3 12 8.2 46 10.1 93 26.8 
1992 137 165 76.6 39 10.7 15 4.5 35 44.6 76 16.8 
1993 162 194 100.6 60 16.4 15 33.6 60 32.3 59 18.3 
1994 186 235 83.5 74 19.6 22 3.3 64 23.6 75 37 
1995 224 271 104.8 85 28.5 22 5 77 29.6 87 41.7 
1996 253 319 124.0 94 35.3 32 7.3 89 44.8 98 36.6 
1997 354 463 191.0 131 68.8 45 16.5 125 53.3 162 52.4 
1998 428 589 262.9 184 66.8 51 35.1 138 29.6 213 131.4 
1999 498 723 441.1 260 169.3 48 101.5 183 93.0 232 77.3 
2000 595 916 435.4 280 161.7 132 70.2 268 137.7 245 65.8 
2001 407 568 248.5 179 93.6 44 23.7 163 65.0 182 66.2 
2002 338 445 178.6 172 109.1 32 8.6 99 19.9 142 41 
2003 280 364 133.0 108 33.5 34 40.9 72 27.9 150 30.7 
2004 325 420 159.0 116 56.3 20 10.6 108 17.2 176 74.9 
2005 426 574 316.6 182 104 34 42 142 105.5 216 65.1 
2006 463 648 372.5 223 100.4 32 33.7 140 98.1 253 140.3 
2007 498 699 287.4 229 96.2 27 15.7 164 52.7 279 122.8 
2008 306 403 316.5 139 58.2 15 3.01 90 15.7 159 239.6 
2009 185 229 97.3 86 37.6 19 16.6 45 7.4 79 35.7 
2010 254 328 164.6 139 85.2 9 2.7 67 37.0 113 39.7 
Total 6476 8742 4147.2 2818 1359.5 660 482.71 2175 944.9 3089 1360.1 
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are more likely to use stock to finance an acquisition, and stock financing also becomes more likely 
when acquirers’ pre-acquisition stock returns are higher (Martin, 1996). Also Martin (1996) argues 
that the higher institutional shareholdings and blockholdings there are in acquirer companies, the 
less likely acquisition deals are will be financed with stock. However, as the main purpose of my 
purpose is not to discussing motivations underlying the method of payment used in acquisitions, I 
do not further analyze the difference in method of payment down this road. To see whether such 
difference is caused by the existence of a large number of small-sized deals, I make a histogram 
categorizing all sample deals according to their deal size. As shown in Table 5, over 60% (5341) of 
total deals in the sample have a deal value no higher than 100 million Euros. This to some extent 
justifies why deals fully financed by cash take a much higher portion in total the sample when 
compared with the findings by JPV (2008). 
The ninth column and the eleventh column in Table 4 show that the number of deals financed by 
combined consideration and unknown consideration also make a substantial part of the total deals 
each year. In terms of value of deals in different categories, cash acquisition has the highest total 
deal value. Stock acquisition and unknown acquisition have similar total deal value, and combined 
acquisition has the lowest total deal value. 
Table 5 Deal Breakdown by Deal Value  
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Before correlating CAR returns against various independent variables, I first use univariate 
analysis to test whether acquirers’ level of acquisition performance is persistent in consecutive 
acquisition deal in terms of CAR. The univariate analysis is conducted for Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) as well as Acquirer share (-1, +1) 
To test the persistence of Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), I place every acquirer’s first acquisition deal 
into 10 deciles according to its Acquirer CAR (-1, +1). Then I calculate Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) for 
each acquisition’s next acquisition and place them into 10 deciles according to the ranking of their 
Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) in the prior deal. Afterwards I calculate the average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
in each decile and test whether the average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) between different deciles are 
statistically different. 
The test for Combined CAR (-1, +1) persistence and Acquirer share (-1, +1) persistence follows 
similar logic as mentioned above, although in the case of testing for Acquirer share (-1, +1) 
persistence, the sample size is much smaller because we have excluded all observations where 
either Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) or Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative. 
5.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In this part I will introduce the methodology and variables used in the multivariate regression 
analysis. 
5.2.1 Dependent variables 
I use four variables as different measure for acquirers’ performance. They are: Acquirer CAR (-1, 
+1), Target CAR (-1, +1), Acquirer share (-1, +1) and Combined CAR (-1, +1). I give detailed 
explanation for each of these four variables as follows. 
Acquirers’ performance is measured by market reaction to an acquisition announcement using 
daily stock return to calculate average cumulative abnormal return (CAR). CAR is defined as the 
difference between the actual stock return and the value-weighted market index return over a certain 
period centered on the acquisition announcement date. I denote Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) as 
measurement for acquirers’ ability to creating value for their own company. Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
is calculated over 3-day period centered on the acquisition announcement date. 
Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) = (       -    ) + (        -    )                                           (1) 
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Where 
        = the acquirer’s stock return from -1 day to the deal announcement date 
        = value-weighted index return of the acquirer’s main listing market from -1 day to the deal            
announcement date 
          = the acquirer’s stock return from the deal announcement date to +1 day 
          = value-weighted index return of the acquirer’s main listing market from the deal 
announcement date to +1 day 
Acquirers’ performance can also be measured by their ability to bargain in acquisition. Strong 
bargain power usually enables acquirers to pay lower premium in the deal. Scholars have been 
using abnormal stock returns to target companies as a measurement for premium paid to target 
companies (Huang and Walkling, 1987, Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983). To this end I denote 
Target CAR (-1, +1). It measures excess stock returns to target companies, which I consider as the 
premium paid by acquirers in acquisitions. Target CAR (-1, +1) is calculated over 3-day period 
centered on the acquisition announcement date. For a target company that is a subsidiary of a public 
company, I use the three-day period CAR of the parent company as Target CAR (-1, +1). For a 
target company that is private, Target CAR (-1, +1) is cannot be calculated. 
Target CAR (-1, +1) = (       -    ) + (        -    )                                                (2) 
Where 
        = the target company’s stock return from -1 day to the deal announcement date 
       = value-weighted index return of the target company’s main listing market from -1 day to 
the deal announcement date 
          = the target company’s stock return from the deal announcement date to +1 day 
         = value-weighted index return of the target company’s main listing market from the deal 
announcement date to +1 day 
Another approach to measure acquirers’ bargaining power is acquirers’ ability to extracting 
value from acquisition deals. I denote Acquirer’s share (-1, +1) to for this purpose. Acquirer’s share 
(-1, +1) is calculated as: 
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Acquirer Share (-1, +1) = 
                                  
                                                                 
                              
In some cases the Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) or the Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative. This can 
lead to either a negative Acquirer’s share (-1, +1) (when Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) is positive and 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative) or a positive Acquirer’s share (-1, +1) which does not make 
economic sense (when both Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) is positive and Combined CAR (-1, +1) are 
negative). Following JPV (2008) I exclude all observations where either the Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
or the Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative. In this way I only focus on deals that create value for 
both the acquirers and the acquirers and the target companies as a whole when analyzing the 
acquirer’s ability to extracting value. This leads to a smaller sample size for this part of analysis, 
and might also affect the analysis results as part of the observations are arbitrarily excluded. 
To measure the total value created for both an acquirer and a target company in a deal, I define 
Combined CAR (-1, +1). Combined CAR (-1, +1) is calculated as the total of Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
and Target CAR (-1, +1) in a deal, weighted by the market value of the acquirer and the target 
company two days prior to the deal announcement. For a target company that is a subsidiary of a 
public company, I use the market value of the parent company two days prior to the deal 
announcement as MV (target). For a target company that is private, MV (target) is not available so 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) cannot be calculated. 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) = 
                                                                 
                         
                              
Where 
MV (acquirer) = market value of the acquirer two day prior to the deal announcement 
MV (target)     = market value of the target company two day prior to the deal announcement 
Descriptive statistics for dependent variables are presented in Table 6. Sample A includes all 
8742 deals. As expected, acquisitions seem to have bigger impacts on target CAR than on acquirer 
CAR. The average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) in Sample A is 0.71%, while the average Target CAR (-1, 
+1) is significantly higher at 5.73%. In Sample A 1505 observations for Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
are obtained. For Acquirer share (-1, +1), since we exclude all observations whenever the Acquirer 
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CAR (-1, +1) or the Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative, we have a much smaller sample size for 
Acquirer share (-1, +1). The total number of observations for Acquirer share (-1, +1) is 651. 
From Sample B to Sample D, descriptive statistics are presented according the public status of 
target companies. Sample B contains all deals when the targets are private companies. Sample C 
includes all deals when the targets are public companies, and Sample D includes all deals when the 
targets are subsidiaries. We can see from the third column of Table 6 that average Acquirer CAR (-
1, +1) is higher when the target is a private company than when the target is either is public 
company or a subsidiary, resonating theoretical arguments that higher stock returns when an 
acquirer buys a private company. Target CAR (-1, +1), Combined CAR (-1, +1) and Acquirer share 
(-1, +1) are not reported in Sample B since we cannot calculate them for private companies. 
One very interesting observation in the third column is that in all sample groups except Sample 
C, average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) is positive.  When the targets are public companies, however, 
average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) becomes negative. This observation is consistent with JPV’s work 
(2008), where they find average Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) significantly negative for public targets 
based on evidence in US market. This observation also resonates with most existing literatures that 
report negative stock returns for acquirers that by public companies. Officer (2007) explains this by 
arguing that compared with similar publicly traded targets, stand-alone private target companies or 
subsidiaries of other companies are usually in greater need for liquidity prior to acquisition. As a 
result of this greater need for liquidity, they are sold at discounts compared to publicly traded 
targets, which yields higher excess stock return to acquirers. 
In the seventh column, we can see average acquirer’s size is rather constant across different 
sample groups, although the median acquirer’s size is smaller when target companies are private. 
Also, the eighth column shows that average deal size is biggest when acquirers buy public targets. 
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Table 6 Acquirers and targets performance under different categorization of acquisitions  This table reports the acquirers and targets performance 
categorized by the public status of target companies. Also, acquirer’s size, deal size and deal size relative to acquirers’ size are reported. 
Period 
  
Acquirer 
CAR (-1, 
+1) 
Target  
CAR (-1, 
+1) 
Combined  
CAR (-1, 
+1) 
Acquirer 
share (-1, 
+1) 
Acquirer 
size 
(millions 
Euros) 
Deal size (millions 
Euros) 
Relative 
size (%) 
          Sample A: Total deals 
1991-2010 Mean 
 
0.69% 5.73% 1.90% 51.82% 7437 474 25.82% 
 
Median 
 
0.26% 0.99% 0.76% 50.52% 724 62 8.97% 
 
N 
 
8742 3075 1505 651 
   
Sample B: Private 
1991-2010 Mean 
 
1.61% 
   
7462 443 15.21% 
 
Median 
 
0.28% 
   
812 60 7.31% 
 
N 
 
3157 
      
Sample C: Public 
1991-2010 Mean 
 
-1.02% 10.45% 3.65% 56.71% 7553 580 31.78% 
 
Median 
 
0.23% 3.76% 1.56% 52.32% 757 75 11.82% 
 
N 
 
1829 1373 436 138 
   
Sample D: Subsidiary 
1991-2010 Mean 
 
0.75% 1.90% 1.19% 50.50% 7360 448 31.81% 
 
Median 
 
0.38% 0.43% 0.39% 47.21% 650 62 9.83% 
 
N 
 
3756 1702 1069 513 
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5.2.2 Control variables 
Most control variables are based on characteristics pertinent to acquisition deals. Theoretical 
background and detailed explanation for these characteristics are provided in the literature review 
part of my thesis. Here I will go through how control variables corresponding to these 
characteristics are selected and calculated. 
MANAGERIAL SKILLS 
Tobin’s Q are widely used as a measurement for managerial skills (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Servaes (1991) also finds significant relations between Tobin’Q and 
excess stock returns to acquirers and target companies in acquisitions. Datastream reports 
companies’ market value of equity / book value of net assets ratio on a daily basis. I use this ratio as 
a proxy for Tobin’s Q and I use in my thesis Tobin’s Q reported two days before the deal 
announcement date. 
PUBLIC STATUS OF THE TARGET COMPANY 
Public status of the target company is reported by SDC in each acquisition deal. I create a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the target company is private and zero otherwise. 
SIZE EFFECT 
Two variables are created to capture the size effect. First I use the ratio between the value of an 
acquisition deal and market value of the acquirer to measure the relative size effect. Also I include 
the natural log of acquirers’ market value (in million Euros). Acquirers’ market value is taken as 
reported by Datastream two days before the deal announcement date. 
DOMESTIC/INTERNATIONAL TARGET 
SDC reports the country where the headquarter or the main business activities of a company are 
located. I create a dummy variable and it is set to one if an acquirer and a target company are 
located in the same country and zero otherwise. 
METHOD OF PAYMENT 
As discussed in the literature review part, more conclusive research regarding the impact of 
method of payment on acquirers’ performance is often conducted in connection with the public 
status of the target company. I create a set of dummy variables. Each of the dummy variables is set 
to 1 if a specific combination of public status of the target company / method of payment is met. For 
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example, the dummy variable private / cash is set to 1 if in a deal the target is a private company 
and the deal is fully financed by cash. 
INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION 
To control for the potential effect, a dummy variable is created which equals to 1 if the target 
company and the acquirer are in the same industry, and equals to 0 otherwise. Categorization of the 
target company and the acquirer industry is based on primary SIC codes reported by SDC and they 
are matched with the industry classification developed by Fama and French (1997). 
TIME LAG BETWEEN TWO CONSECUTIVE DEALS 
For the same acquirer, I calculate the natural log of time lag (in year) between two consecutive 
deals. Time lag is calculated by the deal announcement date for two consecutive deals reported by 
SDC. 
COMPETING BIDDERS 
SDC also reports whether more than one potential acquirer are competing for a target company. I 
create a dummy variable and set it to 1 if SDC returns “Yes” in the “Competing bidder” cell. The 
dummy variable is set to zero other wise. 
M&A ADVISOR’ PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
As mentioned in my literature review, based on US market data Bao and Edmans (2009) find 
that previously well-performing advisors continue to outperform in current acquisition deals, as 
measured by the Acquirer CAR (-1, +1). 
Bao and Edmans (2009) attribute all acquirers’ CAR to the advisors skills. In my thesis the 
purpose is to analyze the performance persistence of the acquirers instead of that of the advisors. In 
order to capture the impacts of advisors’ skills on the CAR to acquirers, I use the market share of 
each advisor in the M&A market as a proxy for the advisors’ market reputation and thus skills. I 
calculate an M&A advisor’s market share as the ratio between total Euro value of deals advised by 
the advisor in one year and the total Euro value of all acquisition deals in the same year. Then based 
on the calculated market share I place M&A advisors into ten deciles, which decile 1 containing 
advisors that have highest market share and decile 10 containing advisors that have lowest market 
share. I then create a set of dummy variables. Each of the variables is set to 1 if the M&A advisor of 
a deal belongs to a specific decile. The dummy variables are assigned to both the acquirer and the 
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target company in a deal. For acquirers or target companies that have more than one M&A advisors, 
the dummy variable is set according to the M&A advisor with the highest market share. 
YEAR DUMMIES 
I create a set of year dummy and each of them is set to 1 if an acquisition occurred in a specific 
year. I identify 1999, 2000, 2001, 2006 and 2007 as years with high frequency of acquisition 
activities in my sample and I use the year dummies to control for these years. 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES 
Many scholars in finance research have excluded data from certain industries in their analysis. 
These industries usually include finance companies and utilities. I create a set of dummy variables 
and each of them is set to 1 if either the acquirer or the target company in a deal is from one of the 
two industry sectors. 
5.2.3 Regression model 
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to analyze the relation between acquirers’ 
prior performance and current performance. I use the following four regression models and run 
them in EViews: 
Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) =    +   *Acquirer prior CAR (-1, +1) +   *   + ε                               (5) 
Where 
                                            = intercept coefficient 
 
 
                                          = coefficient for Acquirer Prior CAR (-1, +1) 
Acquirer prior CAR (-1, +1) = the same acquirer’s CAR (-1, +1) in prior deal 
 
 
                                           = coefficient for control variable   , i >= 2 
                                            = control variable based on deal characteristics, i >= 2 
ε                                             = disturbance term 
Target CAR (-1, +1) =    +   * Prior Target CAR (-1, +1) +   *   + ε                                     (6) 
Where 
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                                            = intercept coefficient 
 
 
                                          = coefficient for Prior Target CAR (-1, +1) 
Prior Target CAR (-1, +1)    = Target CAR (-1, +1) in the same acquirer’s prior deal 
 
 
                                           = coefficient for control variable   , i >= 2 
                                            = control variable based on deal characteristics, i >= 2 
ε                                             = disturbance term 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) =    +   * Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) +   *   + ε                         (7) 
Where 
                                               = intercept coefficient 
 
 
                                             = coefficient for Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) = Combined CAR (-1, +1) in the same acquirer’s prior deal 
 
 
                                             = coefficient for control variable   , i >= 2 
                                              = control variable based on deal characteristics, i >= 2 
ε                                               = disturbance term 
Acquirer share CAR (-1, +1) =    +   * Prior Acquirer share CAR (-1, +1) +   *   + ε           (8) 
Where 
                                                      = intercept coefficient 
 
 
                                                    = coefficient for Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
Prior Acquirer share CAR (-1, +1) = Acquirer share CAR (-1, +1) in the same acquirer’s prior deal 
 
 
                                                    = coefficient for control variable   , i >= 2 
                                                     = control variable based on deal characteristics, i >= 2 
ε                                                      = disturbance term 
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6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In Table 7 univariate analysis results are presented. Column 1, 3, 5, and 7 show acquirers’ 
average performance in prior deals and Column 2, 4, 6, 8 summarize same acquirers’ average 
performance in current deals. In the second column the difference between average Prior Acquirer 
CAR (-1, +1) in two extreme decile is 16.93%, indicating that even though the conclusion regarding 
acquirers’ excess stock returns following acquisitions is less clear on an overall level, on individual 
level acquirers do obtain very different levels of excess stock return. Cross-column comparison 
between the third and the fifth column shows that in each decile group, Target CAR (-1, +1) is 
larger than Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), confirming the empirical evidence that target companies 
typically enjoy more uplift in share price following a deal announcement than acquirers do. The 
similar pattern can be observed between the third column and the fifth column, although, except in 
the tenth decile. 
The main purpose of the univariate analysis is to test whether acquirers’ from two extreme decile 
groups exhibit significantly different performance level measured by CARs, as they do in prior 
deals. In the third column the difference in mean Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) between the first decile and 
the tenth decile is 0.35%. This is an economically significant difference as it show acquirers in the 
first decile outperformance acquirers in the last decile by more than 50% (0.35%/0.67% = 52.23%). 
However, this difference is not statistically significant, which is a different result as reported in 
JPV’s work (2008). Also, if acquirers do exhibit perfect performance persistence measured by 
Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), one would expected the Mean Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) value in the third 
column decrease monotonically from Decile 1 through Decile 10, which is not observed in the 
results presented here. 
In the fifth column, Mean Target CAR (-1, +1) in Decile 1 is 4.63% higher than the value in 
Decile 2, and the difference is statistically significant, although the values in the column do not 
change monotonically. Since I consider Target CAR (-1, +1) as a measurement for the premium 
paid to target companies by acquirers, which reflects acquirers’ bargaining power, this result seems 
to indicate that acquirers who pay high premium in prior deals tend to continue paying more in 
following deals, and the reverse holds for acquirers who pay less premium in prior deals. However, 
this can easily be a false allegation, mostly notably because if different acquirers focus on different 
industries to make serial acquisitions, the persistence in Target CAR (-1, +1) may result from  
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Table 7 Univariate analysis results on acquirers’ performance persistence  
This table reports acquirers’ performance in deciles ranked by acquirers’ prior acquisition 
performance. All acquisitions where the same acquirer makes a following deal are placed into ten 
decile groups according to Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
and Acquirer Share (-1, +1) in prior deals. Deals with highest CARs are placed in Decile 1 and 
deals with lowest CARs are grouped in Decile 10. Then I calculate CARs for each prior deal’s 
following deal. The mean values are calculated for Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) and Acquirer Share (-1, +1) in following deals, denoted as Mean Acquirer 
CAR (-1, +1), Mean Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), Mean Combined CAR (-1, +1) and Mean Acquirer 
Share (-1, +1) in Column 2, Column 4, Column 6 and Column 8, respectively. Similarly, acquirers’ 
average performance in prior deals is presented in Column 1, Column 3, Column 5 and Column 7. 
T-values are reported below each difference between decile 1 mean value and decile 10 mean value. 
***, ** and * represents the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, 
respectively. 
  Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   
  Prior Mean Prior Mean Prior Mean Prior Mean 
  Acquirer Acquirer Target Target Combined Combined Acquirer Acquirer 
Decile CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR Share Share 
(Prior 
Deal) 
(-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) (-1,+1) 
                  
1 10.26% 1.02% 37.09% 6.67% 17.42% 3.60% 98.50% 74.90% 
                  
2 3.89% 0.71% 11.23% 7.39% 5.45% 2.74% 96.21% 68.75% 
                  
3 2.25% 1.15% 5.08% 4.60% 3.15% 1.85% 95.32% 90.36% 
                  
4 1.27% 0.68% 2.63% 3.36% 2.11% 2.74% 94.15% 81.74% 
                  
5 0.58% 0.47% 1.46% 6.18% 1.30% 2.50% 93.38% 92.46% 
                  
6 0.00% 0.76% 0.63% 3.86% 0.63% 2.09% 76.78% 85.31% 
                  
7 -0.57% 0.59% -0.18% 3.13% -0.04% 1.40% 49.36% 73.64% 
                  
8 -1.28% 0.71% -1.07% 4.67% -0.78% 0.52% 20.00% 65.81% 
                  
9 -2.41% 0.55% -2.18% 4.27% -1.89% 1.35% 6.91% 68.68% 
                  
10 -6.67% 0.67% -7.75% 2.04% -5.90% 1.51% 1.34% 51.01% 
                  
Diff. of 
Means 
16.93% 0.35% 44.84% 4.63%** 23.32%  2.09%* 97.16%  23.89%* 
Dec. 1 v. 
Dec. 10 
  (-1.20)   (-2.95)   (-1.63)   (-1.79) 
                  
N 6869 6869 1101 1101 489 489 283 283 
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different business fundamentals and dynamics in different industry sectors. In multivariate analysis 
part I introduce independent variables to control for this potential industry effect. 
In the seventh column, the difference in Mean Combined CAR (-1, +1) between the two extreme 
deciles is 2.09% and it is barely significant at 10% confidence level. This result offers first evidence 
that acquirers exhibit performance persistence in terms of creating combined value for both the 
acquirer’s company and the target company. 
In the last column which reports acquirers’ share of total stock returns following a deal 
announcement, the difference between the first decile and the last decile 23.89% and it is 
statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis that acquirers show performance persistence in 
extracting value for deal. However, when conducting univariate analysis for Mean Acquirer Share 
(-1, +1), I detect several observation in the sample with extraordinarily high value, which distorts 
the statistical features of the sample. This issue arises from the formula used for calculating 
Acquirer Share (-1, +1) (see formula 3). Although I have removed from the sample all observations 
where either the Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) or the Combined CAR (-1, +1) is negative, it does not 
exclude the case when a target company has significantly large negative Target CAR (-1, +1), 
which could essentially reduce the denominator MV (acquirer) * Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) + MV 
(target) * Target CAR (-1, +1) close to zero. This will result in an inflated Acquirer Share (-1, +1) 
which does not carry much economic meaning. To avoid this distortion, I exclude these large 
observations from univariate analysis. In multivariate analysis part I test whether inclusion of these 
observations in the sample cause significant changes to regression result. 
6.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
In this section I present multivariate analysis results of my study. I start with testing acquirers’ 
performance persistence hypothesis measured by acquirers’ own excess stock return, and then I 
move on to test all other hypotheses stated in the beginning part of my thesis. The hypothesis 
regarding M&A advisors’ influence on acquirers’ performance is not tested separately. Instead, it is 
incorporated into the analysis of each of the other hypotheses. 
6.2.1 Acquirers’ performance persistence in creating value for their own company 
I match acquirers’ excess stock returns in current deals with their excess stock returns in prior 
deals, together with other control variables that capture characteristics pertinent to current deals. 
The purpose is to see whether excess stock returns in prior deals exert any measurable influence on 
acquirers’ excess stock returns in current deals. Also, if such influence does exist, I would like to 
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see its robustness in different model specifications. Following JPV (2008), I use Acquirer CAR (-1, 
+1) to measure acquirers’ excess stock returns.  Results of the regression are presented in Table 8. 
I use six different model specifications to run the regression. The specifications are denoted in 
Table 8 from Model 1 through Model 6. In the second column of Table 8, I list out expected effect 
of most independent variables. In Model 1 I run a simple analysis by regression Acquirer CAR (-1, 
+1) on Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) in prior deals, denoted as Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1). The positive 
coefficient indicates the existence of performance persistence for Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1). 
However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. This result is not in consistence with the 
study by JPV (2008), in which they report statistical significance when regressing Acquirer CAR (-
1, +1) on Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) using simple regression. 
In order to see whether it is model specifications that has caused the insignificant coefficient of 
Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1), I introduce a set of control variables in Model 2. These control 
variables are all measurement for characteristics pertinent to acquisition deals. After the 
multivariate regression, it shows that introducing control variables for deal characteristics does not 
improve statistical acceptance level of the hypothesis: Coefficient of Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
becomes even less significant on statistical level, supporting the null hypothesis that acquirers’ do 
not exhibit performance persistence in terms of creating value for their own company. 
Although in Model 2 the coefficient for Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) does not support my 
hypothesis, it is worth noticing coefficients for three control variables are statistically significant. It 
shows the existence of competing bids reduce acquirers’ excess stock return, which is consistent 
with empirical evidence and theoretical predication (Chang, 1990; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988). 
It also indicates that acquirers’ excess stock returns decrease as acquirers increase in size. This 
finding supports the work by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), in which they find a 
negative relation between acquirers’ size and abnormal returns to acquirers. Further explanations 
for this phenomenon can be found in management hubris theory which states that due to 
overconfidence, management in big companies are more likely to pay high premiums in 
acquisitions. Regarding the effect of industry diversification, some scholars argue that when 
acquirers by companies from unrelated industry sectors, they experience negative announcement 
period return (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). In Model 2, 
however, it shows that if acquirers and target companies are from the same industry, the excess 
stock returns to acquirers are actually lower, as indicated by the negative coefficient. This can be 
due to model specification reasons, and it can also result from the fact that previous studies 
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Table 8 Regression analysis result on acquirers’ performance persistence measured by Acquirer CAR (-1, +1)   This table reports 
regression results on acquirers’ performance measured by Acquirer CAR (-1, +1). Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) is calculated as the acquirer’s excess 
stock returns over three-day period centered on the deal announcement date. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
  
0.0072*** 
 
0.0264*** 
 
0.0279*** 
 
0.0026*** 
 
0.0232*** 
 
0.0243*** 
   
(11.71) 
 
(10.26) 
 
(6.31) 
 
(5.78) 
 
(4.80) 
 
(4.97) 
              Prior Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) + 
 
0.0152 
 
0.0139 
 
0.0054 
 
0.0067 
 
0.0049 
 
0.0036 
   
(1.25) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.19) 
              Acquirer/target same industry + 
   
-0.0005 
 
-0.0036* 
 
-0.0039* 
 
-0.0038* 
 
-0.0036* 
     
(-0.35) 
 
(-1.64) 
 
(-1.77) 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(-1.61) 
              Acquirer/target same nation + 
   
-0.0017 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0013 
 
-0.0011 
 
-0.0013 
     
(-1.40) 
 
(-0.90) 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.65) 
              Ln (acquirer MV) - 
   
-0.0025*** 
 
-0.0025*** 
 
-0.0023*** 
 
-0.0023*** 
 
-0.0023*** 
     
(-8.0) 
 
(-5.00) 
 
(-4.70) 
 
(-4.65) 
 
(-4.67) 
              Deal relative size + 
   
0.0001* 
 
-1.92E-05 
 
-1.15E-05 
 
-1.04E-05 
 
-1.01E-05 
     
(1.80) 
 
(-0.54) 
 
(-0.33) 
 
(-0.30) 
 
(0.27) 
              Same industry prior deal + 
   
0.0001 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0006 
     
(0.08) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.26) 
              Ln (time since last deal) + 
   
-0.0002 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0005 
     
(-0.44) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.66) 
 
(0.65) 
              Competing bids - 
   
-0.0117** 
 
-0.0153** 
 
-0.0118* 
 
-0.0121* 
 
-0.0121* 
     
(-2.07) 
 
(-2.24) 
 
(-1.75) 
 
(-1.79) 
 
(-1.80) 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Acquirer's advisor's skills + 
     
0.0002 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
9.56E-05 
       
(0.52) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.27) 
              Acquirer Tobin's Q + 
       
0.0003 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0003 
         
(1.43) 
 
(1.44) 
 
(1.42) 
              Private/cash - 
         
0.0011 
 
0.0013 
           
(0.27) 
 
(0.35) 
              Private/stock + 
         
0.0051 
 
0.0052 
           
(0.59) 
 
(0.60) 
              Private/combination + 
         
0.0032 
 
0.0041 
           
(0.73) 
 
(0.73) 
              Private/unknown 
          
0.0049 
 
0.0050 
           
(1.38) 
 
(1.43) 
              Public/cash + 
         
0.0029 
 
0.0031 
           
(0.78) 
 
(0.84) 
              Public/stock - 
         
0.0027 
 
0.0022 
           
(0.50) 
 
(0.42) 
              Public/combination + 
         
0.0021 
 
0.0056 
           
(0.52) 
 
(0.61) 
              Public/unknown 
          
0.0060 
 
0.0060 
           
(1.05) 
 
(1.07) 
              Subsidiary/cash - 
         
0.0038 
 
0.0037 
           
(1.20) 
 
(1.17) 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Subsidiary/stock + 
         
0.0124 
 
0.0121 
           
(1.39) 
 
(1.35) 
Subsidiary/combination + 
         
0.0132 
 
0.0112 
           
(1.25) 
 
(0.89) 
              Subsidiary/unknown 
          
0.0014 
 
0.0016 
           
(0.48) 
 
(0.55) 
              Year1999 
            
-0.0041 
             
(-1.09) 
              Year2000 
            
0.0021 
             
(0.65) 
              Year2001 
            
-0.0062 
             
(-1.49) 
              Year2006 
            
-0.0043 
             
(-1.17) 
              Year2007 
            
-0.0034 
             
(-0.97) 
              Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.0113 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0089 
 
0.0083 
 
0.0069 
 
0.0071 
N 
  
6879 
 
6745 
 
3259 
 
3123 
 
3123 
 
3123 
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regarding impact of industry diversification on acquirers’ excess stock returns are predominantly 
based on empirical data from 1970s and 1980s, and market sentiment has altered since which favors 
acquirers’ diversification strategy through inorganic growth. 
In Model 3 I introduce the variable “acquirer’s advisor’s skills” to test whether M&A advisors’ 
help enhance acquirers’ performance. The coefficient from regression is both economically and 
statistically insignificant. This result is not surprising, though. In initial data preparation, I use 
M&A advisors’ market share as a proxy for their performance level. Bao and Edmans (2007) point 
out that although past market share has been frequently used as a measurement for M&A advisor’s 
performance, there is in fact a significant negative relation between an advisor’s past market share 
and it’s future performance as measured by creating excess stock returns to acquirers. Regression 
results from my Model 3 have verified this argument. However, it also means the measurement I 
use does not capture M&A advisor’s real performance level. This leaves improvement work for the 
future. 
In Model 4 I include acquirer’s Tobin’s Q in the regression to see whether managerial skills in 
general provide indication for acquirers’ deal performance. However, the coefficient from the 
regression is not statistically significant. 
In Model 5 and Model 6, I include a set of dummy variable to control for the effect of a specific 
combination of target company public status and method of payment used in the deal. The sign of 
the coefficients of these dummy variables are consistent with empirical evidence, expect for the 
public/stock, private/cash and subsidiary/cash combinations. However, none of the coefficients is 
statistically significant. I also introduce year dummy variable into the regression, to control for the 
effect of certain calendar years which have seen high level of M&A activities. Except for Year 2000, 
the coefficients for all other four years seem to suggest that conducting acquisitions in a year with 
overall high level of M&A activities will decrease excess stock returns to acquirers. 
6.2.2 Acquirers’ performance persistence in creating total value for acquirers and target 
companies 
I match acquirers and target companies’ total excess stock returns in current deals with the total 
excess stock returns in prior deals by same acquirers. Following similar approach, I use six different 
regression models to test for the hypothesis. Results of the regression are reported in Table 9.  
As shown in Model 1, simple regression results in a statistically significant coefficient for 
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Table 9 Regression analysis result on acquirers’ performance persistence measured by Combined CAR (-1, +1)  This table reports 
regression results on acquirers’ performance measured by Combined CAR (-1, +1). Combined CAR (-1, +1) is calculated as the acquirer and the 
target company’s total excess stock returns over three-day period centered on the deal announcement date. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * represents the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
  
0.0187*** 
 
0.0929*** 
 
0.1160*** 
 
0.1221*** 
 
0.1198*** 
  
   
(6.71) 
 
(8.03) 
 
(5.68) 
 
(5.62) 
 
(5.34) 
  
              Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) + 
 
0.0758* 
 
0.0561 
 
0.1388** 
 
0.1516** 
 
0.1411** 
  
   
(1.92) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(2.19) 
 
(2.18) 
 
(1.98) 
  
              Acquirer/target same industry + 
   
-0.0062 
 
0.0013 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0012* 
  
     
(-1.09) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.13) 
  
              Acquirer/target same nation + 
   
-0.0158** 
 
-0.0190** 
 
-0.0194** 
 
-0.0201** 
  
     
(-3.01) 
 
(-2.39) 
 
(-2.26) 
 
(-2.23) 
  
              Ln (acquirer MV) - 
   
-0.0089*** 
 
-0.0122*** 
 
-0.0125*** 
 
-0.0122*** 
  
     
(-6.41) 
 
(-5.22) 
 
(-5.27) 
 
(-4.99) 
  
              Deal relative size + 
   
-0.0004** 
 
-0.0027* 
 
-0.0027* 
 
-0.0027*** 
  
     
(-2.06) 
 
(-2.72) 
 
(-2.70) 
 
(-2.68) 
  
              Same industry prior deal + 
   
0.0051 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0056 
  
     
(0.91) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.61) 
  
              Ln (time since last deal) + 
   
0.0007 
 
-0.0040 
 
-0.0042 
 
-0.0046 
  
     
(0.38) 
 
(-1.33) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(-1.41) 
  
              Competing bids - 
   
-0.0298 
 
-0.0284** 
 
-0.0294* 
 
-0.267 
  
     
(-0.75) 
 
(-0.82) 
 
(-0.84) 
 
(-0.74) 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Acquirer's advisor's skills + 
     
-0.0019 
 
-0.0019 
 
-0.0020 
  
       
(-1.24) 
 
(-1.17) 
 
(-1.19) 
  
Target’s advisor’s skills + 
     
0.0006 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0010 
  
       
(0.42) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.65) 
  
              Acquirer Tobin's Q + 
       
-0.0021 
 
-0.0022 
  
         
(-0.71) 
 
(-0.73) 
  
              Private/cash - 
            
              
              Private/stock + 
            
              
              Private/combination + 
            
              
              Private/unknown 
             
              
              Public/cash + 
            
              
              Public/stock - 
            
              
              Public/combination + 
            
              
              Public/unknown 
             
              
              Subsidiary/cash - 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Combined CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Subsidiary/stock + 
            
              
Subsidiary/combination + 
            
              
              Subsidiary/unknown 
             
              
              Year1999 
          
-0.0118 
  
           
(-0.95) 
  
              Year2000 
          
0.0057 
  
           
(0.40) 
  
              Year2001 
          
0.0177 
  
           
(0.84) 
  
              Year2006 
          
0.0066 
  
           
(0.28) 
  
              Year2007 
          
-0.0066 
  
           
(-0.40) 
  
              Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.0055 
 
0.0926 
 
0.1659 
 
0.1663 
 
0.1501 
  
N 
  
489 
 
484 
 
154 
 
151 
 
151 
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Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1), indicating that acquirers’ performance exists when it come to 
creating combined value for both acquirers and target companies. In Model 2 I include common 
control variables that are based on deal characteristics. The coefficient for Prior Combined CAR (-1, 
+1) becomes statistically insignificant but remains economically significant at 0.0561. One 
interesting point in Model 2 is that the coefficient for the control variable “Competing bids” 
becomes insignificant. This could result from model specification reasons. Another explanation is 
that the existence of competing bids typically enhances target companies’ bargaining position, 
which causes value transfer from acquirers to target companies. However, as we now measure 
acquirers’ performance by measuring acquirers’ total value creation capability for both acquirers 
and targets companies, the value transfer between acquirers and target companies does not affect 
this measure, which reduces the explanatory power of the variable “Competing bids”. 
From Model 3 through Model 5 I include M&A advisors’ skills, Acquirers’ Tobin’s Q and year 
dummies in the regression. Because of the smaller sample size, the inclusion of dummy variables 
specifying the combination of target companies’ public status / method of payment causes co-
linearity problems. As a result, they are excluded from the model. 
In Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5, the coefficient for Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) remains 
both economically and statistically significant, providing evidence that acquirers’ performance 
persistence does exist in term of creating combined value for acquirers and target companies.  
From Model 3 through Model 5 the coefficients for both Acquirer’s advisor’s skills and Taregt’s 
advisor’s skills are statistically insignificant, suggesting no performance-enhancing effect from 
M&A advisors. Also the coefficient for Acquirer Tobin’s Q is statistically not significant, offering 
now evidence that acquirers’ managerial skills drive performance in acquisitions. 
6.2.3 Acquirers’ performance persistence in extracting value from deals 
I test this hypothesis by analyzing whether the same acquirers can continue extracting more 
values from acquisition deals. In order to see this I regress Acquirer Share (-1, +1) on Prior 
Acquirer Share (-1, +1), together with other independent variables. Results of the regression are 
reported in Table 10. From Model 1 through Model 5, most independent variables’ coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, expect for one variable in Model 4 and two variables in Model 5. Also, 
the sign and economic significance of most control variables’ coefficients also differs greatly from 
regression results obtained from the first and second hypothesis. This indicates the need to improve 
model specification. Also when selecting observations for the Acquirer Share (-1, +1) sample group, 
I have excluded all observations where either the Acquirer CAR (-1. +1) or the Combined CAR (-1, 
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+1) is negative. The exclusion of observations may have caused disruption to the sample quality.  
Overall, using existing model specification there is no evidence support acquirers’ performance 
persistence in terms of extracting value from deals. Also, multiple regressions do not suggest either 
the skills of acquirers’ advisors or the skills of targets’ advisors are transferrable to enhance 
acquirers’ deal performance.  
6.2.4 Acquirers’ performance persistence in bargaining power 
I measure acquirers’ bargaining power by calculating the excess stock returns to target 
companies following deal announcement. To test whether acquirers show performance persistence 
in their bargaining power, I regress Target CAR (-1, +1) on Target CAR (-1, +1) in prior deals by 
the same acquirer. Regression results are shown in Table 11. 
Through Model 1 to Model 5, coefficient of Prior Target CAR (-1, +1) is statistically significant. 
This can be interpreted as acquirers’ performance persistence in term of their bargaining power, 
which means acquirers who pay less premiums in prior deals tend to continue paying less in 
following deals, while for acquirers who pay high premiums in prior deals, their overpay behavior 
may continue in future deals. This result is consistent from the univariate analysis, where mean 
Target CAR (-1, +1) in the first decile group is statistically different from Target CAR (-1, +1) in 
the last decile group. However, as mentioned in the univariate analysis part, potential industry-
specific effect needs to be controlled to verify whether this statistically significant relation between 
Prior Target CAR (-1, +1) and Target CAR (-1, +1) is actually due to acquirers’ performance 
persistence in bargaining power, or it should be attributed to the fundamental difference in 
acquisition market among different industry sectors. 
The target public status / method of payment dummy set is not included in the model due to 
potential co-linearity problem. 
6.2.5 Analysis results summary 
In Table 12 I present the summary result from both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. 
Based on univariate analysis, evidence is found supporting the hypotheses of acquirers performance 
persistence in term of bargaining power, creating combined value for acquirers and target 
companies, as well as extracting value from the deal. In multivariate analysis part, no statistically 
significant evidence is found supporting acquirers performance persistence in terms of creating 
value for their own company. The result holds the same under both simple regression and multiple 
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Table 10 Regression analysis result on acquirers’ performance persistence measured by Acquirer Share (-1, +1)  This table reports 
regression results on acquirers’ performance measured by Acquirer Share (-1, +1). Acquirer Share (-1, +1) is calculated as the share of an 
acquirer’s CAR (-1, +1) in the market value-weighted sum of the acquirer’s CAR (-1, +1) and the target’s CAR (-1, +1). T-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represents the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer Share (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
  
15.4085 
 
-8.9122 
 
0.4360 
 
1.5540 
 
3.2571 
  
   
(1.06) 
 
(-0.45) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.38) 
  
              Prior Acquirer Share (-1, +1) + 
 
-0.3667 
 
-0.0358 
 
-0.1128 
 
-0.0704 
 
-0.0061 
  
   
(-0.09) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(-0.19) 
 
(-0.02) 
  
              Acquirer/target same industry + 
   
    5.8361 
 
5.312 
 
5.9246 
 
6.2487* 
  
     
(1.21) 
 
(1.62) 
 
(1.72) 
 
(1.76) 
  
              Acquirer/target same nation + 
   
-2.56 
 
-2.1183 
 
-3.4622 
 
-4.3934 
  
     
(-1.15) 
 
(-1.38) 
 
(-1.07) 
 
(-1.29) 
  
              Ln (acquirer MV) - 
   
2.1619 
 
0.5213 
 
0.4057 
 
0.3853 
  
     
(0.27) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.41) 
  
              Deal relative size + 
   
-0.1398 
 
0.1673 
 
0.0919 
 
0.0428 
  
     
(-0.15) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.01) 
  
              Same industry prior deal + 
   
6.015 
 
-5.216 
 
-5.5386 
 
-5.6498 
  
     
(0.63) 
 
(-1.58) 
 
(-1.59) 
 
(-1.60) 
  
              Ln (time since last deal) + 
   
3.562 
 
1.8449 
 
1.9615* 
 
2.2211* 
  
     
(1.45) 
 
(1.63) 
 
(1.69) 
 
(1.78) 
  
              Competing bids - 
   
-8.1513 
 
-3.7519 
 
-4.2363 
 
-3.3708 
  
  
 
   
(-0.56) 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(-0.32) 
 
(-0.25) 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer Share (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Acquirer's advisor's skills + 
     
0.1185 
 
-0.0157 
 
-0.0585 
  
       
(0.20) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(-0.09) 
  
Target’s advisor’s skills + 
     
-0.3151 
 
-0.2594 
 
-0.2827 
  
       
(-0.60) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.51) 
  
              Acquirer Tobin's Q + 
       
-0.4959 
 
-0.60 
  
         
(-0.45) 
 
(-0.53) 
  
              Private/cash - 
            
              
              Private/stock + 
            
              
              Private/combination + 
            
              
              Private/unknown 
             
              
              Public/cash + 
            
              
              Public/stock - 
            
              
              Public/combination + 
            
              
              Public/unknown 
             
              
              
Subsidiary/cash - 
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Simple Regressions  
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Acquirer Share (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Subsidiary/stock + 
            
              
Subsidiary/combination + 
            
              
              Subsidiary/unknown 
             
              
              Year1999 
          
0.1203 
  
           
(0.03) 
  
              Year2000 
          
-0.8365 
  
           
(-0.16) 
  
              Year2001 
          
-1.2329 
  
           
(-0.15) 
  
              Year2006 
          
-9.9445 
  
           
(-1.11) 
  
              Year2007 
          
-5.0585 
  
           
(-0.80) 
  
              Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.0055 
 
0.0101 
 
0.0461 
 
0.0391 
 
0.0516 
  
N 
  
489 
 
484 
 
154 
 
151 
 
151 
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Table 11 Regression analysis result on acquirers’ performance persistence measured by Target CAR (-1, +1)   This table reports regression 
results on acquirers’ bargaining power measured by Target CAR (-1, +1). Taregt CAR (-1, +1) is calculated as the acquirer’s excess stock returns 
over three-day period centered on the deal announcement date. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Target CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
  
0.0433*** 
 
0.0741*** 
 
0.0859*** 
 
0.0796** 
 
0.0815** 
  
   
(10.30) 
 
(4.22) 
 
(3.23) 
 
(2.24) 
 
(2.25) 
  
              Prior Target CAR (-1, +1) + 
 
0.0608** 
 
0.0582** 
 
0.0690 
 
0.1282** 
 
0.1278** 
  
   
(2.08) 
 
(1.96) 
 
(1.61) 
 
(2.48) 
 
(2.45) 
  
              Acquirer/target same industry + 
   
    -0.0081 
 
-0.0016 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0048 
  
     
(-0.91) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.32) 
  
              Acquirer/target same nation + 
   
-0.0283*** 
 
-0.0309** 
 
-0.0288** 
 
-0.0290** 
  
     
(-3.55) 
 
(-2.78) 
 
(-2.12) 
 
(-2.11) 
  
              Ln (acquirer MV) - 
   
-0.0009 
 
-0.0028 
 
-0.0015 
 
-0.0017 
  
     
(-0.44) 
 
(-1.03) 
 
(-0.42) 
 
(-0.47) 
  
              Deal relative size + 
   
-0.0001 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0003 
  
     
(-0.39) 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(-0.12) 
  
              Same industry prior deal + 
   
-0.0080 
 
-0.0083 
 
-0.0069 
 
-0.0081 
  
     
(-0.91) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.55) 
  
              Ln (time since last deal) + 
   
0.0098*** 
 
0.0062 
 
0.0022 
 
0.0027 
  
     
(3.33) 
 
(1.49) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.51) 
  
              Competing bids - 
   
-0.0295 
 
-0.0285 
 
-0.0316 
 
-0.0283 
  
     
(-0.71) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-0.69) 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Target CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Acquirer's advisor's skills + 
     
0.0028 
 
0.2465 
 
0.1310 
  
       
(1.41) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.01) 
  
Target’s advisor’s skills + 
     
-0.0030 
 
-0.0019 
 
-0.0019 
  
       
(-0.61) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(-0.79) 
  
              Acquirer Tobin's Q + 
       
-0.0064 
 
-0.0071 
  
         
(-1.00) 
 
(-1.08) 
  
              Private/cash - 
            
              
              Private/stock + 
            
              
              Private/combination + 
            
              
              Private/unknown 
             
              
              Public/cash + 
            
              
              Public/stock - 
            
              
              Public/combination + 
            
              
              Public/unknown 
             
              
              
Subsidiary/cash - 
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Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Expected Target CAR (-1, +1) 
  Effect   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Subsidiary/stock + 
            
              
Subsidiary/combination + 
            
              
              Subsidiary/unknown 
             
              
              Year1999 
          
0.0149 
  
           
(0.64) 
  
              Year2000 
          
-0.0089 
  
           
(-0.37) 
  
              Year2001 
          
0.0059 
  
           
(0.20) 
  
              Year2006 
          
0.0065 
  
           
(0.27) 
  
              Year2007 
          
-0.0095 
  
           
(-0.36) 
  
              Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.0055 
 
0.0279 
 
0.0025 
 
0.0069 
 
0.0325 
  
N 
  
489 
 
1086 
 
541 
 
334 
 
334 
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Table 12 Summary results of univariate analysis and multivariate analysis    This table reports 
the test results for performance persistence hypotheses. In univariate analysis, for each of the four 
measurements of acquirers performance persistence the existence of performance persistence is 
determined by whether the mean value from two extreme deciles are significantly different. In 
multivariate analysis, for each of the four measurements of acquirers performance persistence, the 
existence of performance persistence is determined by regressing the observed value of the 
measurement in current acquisition on the observed value of the measurement in prior acquisition 
by the same acquirer. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
regressions under different model specifications. This result contradicts the work by JPV, where 
they report statistically significant results supporting acquirers performance persistence in terms of 
creating value for their own company. 
For acquirers performance persistence measured by Target CAR (-1, +1), the coefficient of Prior 
Target CAR (-1, +1) is statistically significant in all model specifications except in Model 3, where 
the t-value of the coefficient is close to the edge of statistical significance at 10% confidence level. 
Without controlling for industry specific effects, this result supports the hypothesis that acquirers 
possess performance persistence in terms of bargaining power.   
For acquirers’ capability to create combined value for both acquirers and target companies, 
statistically significant and positive relation is found between Prior Combined CAR (-1, +1) and 
Combined CAR (-1, +1), suggesting acquirers that create combined value in prior deals do tend to 
continue generating combined excess stock returns in following deals. This result can be an 
indication for the consistency of managerial skills in selecting acquisition targets and executing 
acquisition plans. 
 
Univariate 
 
Multivariate 
  Analysis   Analysis 
    
 
Performance  
 
Performance  
  Persistence   Persistence 
Acuqirer CAR (-1, +1) No 
 
No 
Target CAR (-1, +1) Yes 
 
Yes 
Combined CAR (-1, +1) Yes 
 
Yes 
Acuqirer Share (-1, +1) Yes 
 
No 
48 
 
Regarding acquirers performance persistence measured by their ability to extracting value from 
acquisition deals, multivariate regressions do not yield any statistically significant results. Besides, 
the low t-value for most of the control variables indicates the model specification need to be 
improved. Also part of the reasons for the insignificant regression results can be attributed to the 
small sample size and the observations with extraordinarily high Acquirer Share (-1, +1) value in 
the sample, as mentioned in previous part of my thesis. 
7. ROBUSTNESS TEST 
In this part I provide robustness test to see how initial results regarding acquirers performance 
persistence will hold. 
JPV (2008) mention in their work that due to the methodology SDC uses in defining the deal 
announcement date, the date of deal announcement reported by SDC can be different from the date 
when a deal is first disclosed to the market. As a result, excess stock returns measured surround 
three-day period centered on the deal announcement date might not capture the total stock price 
effect caused by the deal announcement. To capture the potential effect of this, I use CAR (-2, +2) 
and CAR (-3, +3) to substitute all measures of acquirers’ performance and use them in the 
multivariate analysis. I report all analysis results using CAR (-2, +2) in Table 14, and all analysis 
results using CAR (-3, +3) in Table 15. Each hypothesis is tested using six different model 
specifications. Only coefficients for intercept, Prior CAR are reported. Table 13 lists out control 
variables included in each model specification. 
In Table 14 the statistical significance of all Prior CAR measures’ coefficients are improved, 
except for Acquirer Share (-2, +2). Results from Table 14 support the hypotheses that acquirers 
exhibit performance persistence in terms of creating value for their own company, creating 
combined value for acquirers and target companies, as well as in terms of their bargaining power. 
The fact that substituting CAR (-1, +1) with CAR (-2, +2) significantly improves the statistical 
significance of multivariate regression partly support the assumption that CAR (-1, +1) might not 
have captures all price effect brought by the deal announcements. 
In Table 15 the statistical significance of Prior CAR measures’ coefficients  are also improved, 
but to a less extent compared with results from Table 14.  I interpret this improvement as showing 
CAR (-3, +3) also captures more price effect brought by the deal announcements  than CAR (-1, +1) 
does, however at the same time CAR (-3, +3) introduces more market noise in the price fluctuation 
compared with  CAR (-2, +2)   
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Table 13    Detailed model specifications   This table reports all control variables included in each 
of the six model specifications.  A variable with a “*” means it is included in the corresponding 
regression model. 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Prior CAR * * * * * * 
       
Acquirer/target same 
industry 
 * * * * * 
       
Acquirer/target same 
nation 
 * * * * * 
       
Ln (acquirer MV)  * * * * * 
       
Deal relative size  * * * * * 
       
Same industry prior 
deal 
 * * * * * 
       
Ln (time since last 
deal) 
 * * * * * 
       
Competing bids  * * * * * 
       
Acquirer's advisor's 
skills 
  * * * * 
       
Target’s advisor’s 
skills 
  * * * * 
       
Acquirer Tobin's Q    * * * 
       
Dummy set "public 
status of  target 
    * * 
company/method of 
payment 
      
       
Year dummy      * 
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Table 14   Multivariate analysis using CAR (-2, +2)    This table reports multivariate analysis results using CAR (-2, +2) in all measures of 
acquirers performance persistence. Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) refers to acquirers’ five-day excess stock returns following deal announcement 
centered on the deal announcement date.  Target CAR (-2, +2) refers to target companies’ five-day excess stock returns following deal 
announcement centered on the deal announcement date. Combined CAR (-2, +2) is the sum of Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) and Target CAR (-2, +2) 
weighted by acquirers’ market value and targets’ market value two-days prior to the deal announcement date.  Acquirer Share (-2, +2) is the 
market value-weighted share of Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) in the sum of Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) and Target CAR (-2, +2). For the multivariate 
analysis with Target CAR (-2, +2), Combined CAR (-2, +2) and Acquirer Share (-2, +2), dummy set “public status of target company / method 
of payment” is not included in Model 6 due to co-linearity problem. Excluding this set of dummy variables, Model 5 has the same model 
specification as Model 4. So Model 5 in all three cases is not used. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) 
 
 
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0102*** 
 
0.0370*** 
 
0.0480*** 
 
0.3720*** 
 
0.0354*** 
 
0.0363 
  
(13.19) 
 
(11.57) 
 
(6.59) 
 
(11.17) 
 
(9.47) 
 
(9.74) 
             Prior Acquirer CAR (-2, +2) 
 
0.0280** 
 
0.0238** 
 
0.0015 
 
0.0027** 
 
0.0273** 
 
0.0270** 
  
(2.31) 
 
(1.95) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(2.19) 
 
(2.18) 
 
(2.15) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0142 
 
0.01641 
 
0.0157 
 
0.0167 
 
0.0137 
N 
 
6865 
 
6743 
 
2117 
 
6457 
 
6457 
 
6457 
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Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Target CAR (-2, +2) 
 
Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Combined Share (-2, +2) 
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Target CAR (-2, +2) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0554*** 
 
0.0856*** 
 
0.0435 
 
0.0830*** 
   
0.0828*** 
  
(10.80) 
 
(4.01) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(3.56) 
   
(3.51) 
             Prior Target CAR (-2, +2) 
 
0.0791*** 
 
0.0814*** 
 
0.2048*** 
 
0.0780*** 
   
0.0747*** 
  
(2.81) 
 
(2.86) 
 
(3.68) 
 
(2.73) 
   
(2.56) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0071 
 
0.0265 
 
0.0540 
 
0.0354 
   
0.0296 
N 
 
1101 
 
1086 
 
345 
 
345 
   
342 
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Combined CAR (-2, +2) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0226*** 
 
0.1103*** 
 
0.1121*** 
 
0.1181*** 
   
0.1154*** 
  
(6.90) 
 
(7.99) 
 
(4.48) 
 
(4.46) 
   
(4.26) 
             Prior Combined CAR (-2, +2) 
 
0.1652** 
 
0.1327** 
 
0.2435*** 
 
0.2831*** 
   
0.2800*** 
  
(4.00) 
 
(3.30) 
 
(3.48) 
 
(3.78) 
   
(3.66) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0297 
 
0.1063 
 
0.1549 
 
0.1659 
   
0.1598 
N 
 
489 
 
484 
 
154 
 
151 
   
151 
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Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Acquirer Share (-2, +2) 
 
 
  
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Acquirer Share (-2, +2) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.6195*** 
 
-0.0735*** 
 
-0.7270** 
 
-0.7489* 
   
-0.6650 
  
(7.38) 
 
(-2.15) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(-1.80) 
   
(-1.58) 
             Prior Acquirer Share (-2, +2) 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0004 
   
-0.0004 
  
(-0.46) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.63) 
   
(-0,72) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0132 
 
0.0168 
 
0.0133 
   
0.0136 
N 
 
489 
 
484 
 
484 
 
468 
   
468 
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Table 15   Multivariate analysis using CAR (-3, +3)    This table reports multivariate analysis results using CAR (-3, +3) in all measures of 
acquirers performance persistence. Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) refers to acquirers’ five-day excess stock returns following deal announcement 
centered on the deal announcement date.  Target CAR (-3, +3) refers to target companies’ five-day excess stock returns following deal 
announcement centered on the deal announcement date. Combined CAR (-3, +3) is the sum of Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) and Target CAR (-3, +3) 
weighted by acquirers’ market value and targets’ market value two-days prior to the deal announcement date.  Acquirer Share (-3, +3) is the 
market value-weighted share of Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) in the sum of Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) and Target CAR (-3, +3). For the multivariate 
analysis with Target CAR (-3, +3), Combined CAR (-3, +3) and Acquirer Share (-3, +3), dummy set “public status of target company / method 
of payment” is not included in Model 6 due to co-linearity problem. Excluding this set of dummy variables, Model 5 has the same model 
specification as Model 4. So Model 5 in all three cases is not used. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represents the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) 
  
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0118*** 
 
0.0410*** 
 
0.0410*** 
 
0.0421*** 
 
0.0477*** 
 
0.0508*** 
  
(13.42) 
 
(11.19) 
 
(11.21) 
 
(11.10) 
 
(5.02) 
 
(5.30) 
             Prior Acquirer CAR (-3, +3) 
 
0.0154 
 
0.0128 
 
0.0127 
 
0.0144 
 
0.0083 
 
0.0059 
  
(1.33) 
 
(1.10) 
 
(1.09) 
 
(1.21) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.26) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0110 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0109 
 
0.0120 
N 
 
6865 
 
6743 
 
6743 
 
6457 
 
2020 
 
2020 
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Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Target CAR (-3, +3) 
 
 
Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Combined CAR (-3, +3) 
  
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Target CAR (-3, +3) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0102*** 
 
0.0370*** 
 
0.0480*** 
 
0.0450*** 
   
0.0482*** 
  
(13.19) 
 
(11.57) 
 
(6.50) 
 
(5.87) 
   
(6.21) 
             Prior Target CAR (-3, +3) 
 
0.0280** 
 
0.0238** 
 
0.0015 
 
0.0100 
   
0.0079 
  
(2.31) 
 
(1.95) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.43) 
   
(0.34) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0142 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0096 
   
0.0115 
N 
 
6865 
 
6743 
 
2117 
 
2020 
   
2020 
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Combined CAR (-3, +3) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0226*** 
 
0.1103*** 
 
0.1121*** 
 
0.1181*** 
   
0.1154*** 
  
(6.90) 
 
(7.99) 
 
(4.48) 
 
(4.46) 
   
(4.26) 
             Prior Combined CAR (-3, +3) 
 
0.1652** 
 
0.1327*** 
 
0.2435*** 
 
0.2831*** 
   
0.2800*** 
  
(4.00) 
 
(3.30) 
 
(3.48) 
 
(3.78) 
   
(3.66) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0297 
 
0.1063 
 
0.1549 
 
0.1659 
   
0.1598 
N 
 
489 
 
484 
 
154 
 
151 
   
151 
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Test of acquirers performance persistence as measured by Acquirer Share (-3, +3) 
  
 
Simple Regressions 
 
Multiple Regressions 
 
Acquirer Share (-3, +3) 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept 
 
0.0102*** 
 
0.0370*** 
 
0.0048*** 
 
0.0450*** 
   
0.0482*** 
  
(13.19) 
 
(11.57) 
 
(6.50) 
 
(5.87) 
   
(6.21) 
             Prior Acquirer Share (-3, +3) 
 
0.0280** 
 
0.0238** 
 
0.0015 
 
0.0100 
   
0.0079 
  
(2.31) 
 
(1.95) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.43) 
   
(0.34) 
             Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0142 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0096 
   
0.01146 
N 
 
6865 
 
6743 
 
2117 
 
2020 
   
2020 
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8. LIMITATIONS 
The limitation of this thesis includes following: 
 The measures for M&A advisors’ skills does not really capture advisors’ performance level. 
As a result it offers only limited explanation as to how M&A advisors can help boost 
acquirers performance in acquisitions 
 The exclusion of extraordinarily large value when calculating Acquirer Share CAR (-1, +1) 
lacks theoretical foundation 
 More robustness tests can be conducted to see the resilience of analysis results using other 
different measures for acquirers performance 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I examine whether serial acquirers exhibit performance persistence in terms of 
creating value for their own company, creating combined value for both acquirers, extracting value 
for acquisition deals, as well as acquirers’ bargaining power. Based on M&A data in EU 15 
countries from 1991-2010, I use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the main approach to 
measure acquirers’ performance. initially based on CAR (-1, +1), I find in univariate analysis 
evidence of acquirers performance persistence in terms of creating combined value for both 
acquirers, extracting value for acquisition deals, as well as acquirers’ bargaining power. 
Multivariate analysis based on CAR (-1, +1) does not support the hypothesis of acquirers 
performance persistence in terms of either creating value for their own company or extracting value 
for acquisition deals. Performance persistence hypotheses using the other two performance 
measures yield statistically and economically significant results in certain model specifications. By 
substituting CAR (-1, +1) with CAR (-2, +2) and CAR (-3, +3) I found evidence supporting all 
performance persistence hypotheses except for the acquirers’ ability to extracting value from 
acquisition deals.  In addition, empirical test does not support the hypotheses that M&A advisors 
transfer their skills by enhancing acquirers performance, however this result may largely be due to 
imperfect measure for M&A advisors’ skills. 
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